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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROBERT T. JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Res po ndent-Responden t.

)
)
)
)

No. 41414
District Court No. CV-2013-84
(Gooding County)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

)

Appellant, Robert Johnson, offers this Brief in Support of his Petition for Review
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 118. Review is requested because the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that "claim preclusion" barred the claims raised in the successive post-conviction
relief petition at issue is at odds with the plain language of J.C. § 19-4908. Additionally, as set
out in the Opening and Reply Briefs, the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Johnson's
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 1 Accordingly, this Court should accept review,
reverse the judgment dismissing Mr. Johnson's post-conviction relief petition and remand for
further proceedings.

Mr. Johnson's Opening and Reply Briefs as well as the entire record before the Court
of Appeals are fully incorporated herein by this referencc.
1

1 •

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

FIL D-COPY

I. GENERAL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A.

Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings

In 1994, Mr. Johnson's counsel told him that they could not prove his innocence with the
evidence available at that time and that he would be executed within five years unless he pleaded
guilty to first degree felony murder. CR 26-27, 52-55. Confined in solitary at the jail, Mr.
Johnson did not have access to any information to the contrary and was forced to rely on what he
later would learn was faulty information in deciding to enter his guilty pleas. See id. Mr.
Johnson's co-defendant Thomas Peterson, who bore sole responsibility for the murders, pied
guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. CR 49-51, 217.
The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to a determinate life term. CR 217.
On about March 10, 2009, Mr. Peterson handed Mr. Johnson a notarized confession
taking sole responsibility for the murders and acknowledging that Mr. Johnson had acted under
threat of bodily injury or death. CR 39-41. Mr. Peterson also revealed the existence of a
recording of his initial disclosure of the truth to law enforcement twenty-two years prior, which
law enforcement suppressed and the prosecutor withheld in violation of the principles outlined in

Brady v. Maryland. Id. Mr. Johnson did not know that a successive post-conviction application
was the appropriate remedy to bring the new information before the Court but immediately took
steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. CR 56-62, 275-78.
Finally, after about two months of research and attempting to speak with legal counsel, an
attorney finally accepted Mr. Johnson's call and informed his that he could file a successive
application for post-conviction relief. CR 56-57, 277. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the
appropriate request to obtain the paperwork packet from the paralegal, waited for the paperwork
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to arrive through prison mail system, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the appropriate
papcrvvork to make an appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents notarized
and mail them out. CR 278. This process took weeks of waiting. Mr. Johnson filed the instant
successive petition approximately four months after receiving his co-defendant's confessions and
the information about the withheld recording of Mr. Peterson's confession. CR. 24
In the proceedings on Mr. Johnson's 2009 successive post-conviction relief action, his
attorney affirmatively represented that he would take certain actions to support Mr. Johnson's
claims, including filing an amended petition. CR 17-18, 29, 98-100. Mr. Johnson's attorney did
not amend the 2009 petition and did not explain the actions Mr. Johnson took between receiving
Mr. Peterson's revelations and filing the 2009 petition. See CR 226. Once Mr. Johnson realized
that his attorney was not going to support his claims, he attempted to remedy the situation by
filing a number of prose motions, including motions to remove his attorney and to provide
additional time. CR 14, 226.
The district court did not rule on Mr. Johnson's motions regarding his attorney and
instead ruled on the state's motion for summary dismissal. CR 226; see also Response to Notice
oflntent to Dismiss, filed March 29, 2013 (Augmented into Record 9-14-2014). In so ruling, the
district court erroneously applied the standard applicable in death penalty cases to determine that
Mr. Johnson was required to initiate the successive action within 42 days within discovery of his
co-defendant's revelations or demonstrate "extraordinary" reasons for filing after forty-two days.
CR 178-79, 296. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642,649 (2008) (a
reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after
the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows
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that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim
within that time period). The district court found that Mr. Johnson "should have known" that a
successive post-conviction relief petition was the correct forum to address the new information
and that Mr. Johnson did not provide any evidence showing that he took any steps to prepare or
file a post-conviction packet between March 11 and May, 2009. CR 292-93. The district court
found that Mr. Johnson failed to establish that four months after receiving his co-defendant's
revelations was a reasonable time to file the successive petition. Mr. Johnson appealed and the
Court of Appeals affirmed solely on the basis that the district court correctly concluded that Mr.
Johnson had not established that he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. CR
217-221.
B.

Proceedings on 2013 Petition
On February 14, 2013, Mr. Johnson filed the instant successive petition for post-

conviction relief and provided additional evidence regarding the circumstances he encountered
after receiving the information and confession from Mr. Peterson. CR 5-163. After initially
refusing to appoint counsel, the district court appointed counsel for the limited purpose of
addressing the timeliness of the first successive application and whether further consideration of
that issue was foreclosed by the doctrines of res judicata or "law of the case." Order Re
Appointment of Counsel (Augmented into Record on 9-14-2014).
Relying on established precedent, Mr. Johnson alleged that his attorney's ineffective
assistance in the 2009 proceedings was a sufficient reason to justify that failure to adequately
support the timeliness of his petition. CR 247-48. The district court found that ifpostconviction counsel failed to provide facts and admissible evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson
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filed the successive petition within a reasonable time, that failure would constitute "sufficient
reason" justifying a successive petition. CR 289. The district court nonetheless summarily
dismissed the petition, finding that the additional information regarding the challenges Mr.
Johnson encountered in preparing the 2009 petition did not establish that four months was a
reasonable time. CR 283-297. Mr. Johnson appealed.
While Mr. Johnson's appeal was pending, this Court issued its decision in Murphy v.
State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), which overruled the precedent on which Mr. Johnson
had relied to establish a sufficient reason to re-litigate claims that were inadequately presented
due to counsel's ineffective assistance. However, Mr. Johnson noted that in addition to the
ineffective assistance of his post-conviction attorney, the timeliness of his 2009 petition was
inadequately presented as a result of his attorney's affirmative misrepresentations and the district
court's refusal to acknowledge Mr. Johnson's prose motions to remove his attorney prior to the
2009 action being summarily dismissed. Mr. Johnson argued that the affirmative
misrepresentations by counsel and his own efforts to remedy the situation give rise to sufficient
reason to raise claims previously adjudicated in his prior petition, including the timeliness of the
2009 petition. The Court of Appeals concluded that I.C. § 19-4908 does not provide a basis for
Mr. Johnson to reassert claims already adjudicated in his first successive petition. Johnson v.
State, Docket No. 41414 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015). Mr. Johnson petitioned for review.

II. REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED
This Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals determined an issue not
previously considered by this Court and in contradiction to I.C. § l 9-4908's plain language.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, Mr. Johnson's personal efforts to remedy the effect of
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his attorney·s affirmative misrepresentations establishes a sufficient reason vvhy the timeless of
the 2009 successive petition was inadequately presented and to allow Mr. Johnson to re-litigate
that issue in the instant proceedings. Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth in Mr.
Johnson's arguments to the Court of Appeals, this Court should accept review, reverse the
summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
A.

The Court of Appeals' Decision Ignores I.C. § 19-4908's Plain Language

This Court exercises free review over questions of law. State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Statutory construction is a question oflaw. State v. Hickman,
146 Idaho 178, 184, 191 P.3d 1098, 1104 (2008); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d
656, 665 (2004 ). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893,
265 P.3d 502, 506(2011 ).
The statute at issue here provides that:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or
not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant
has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
LC. § 19-4908. A court considering whether there is sufficient reason for filing the claim in a
successive petition must consider whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable time.

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007).
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Here, Mr. Johnson's 2009 successive petition was filed four months after he received the
factual basis for that petition - Mr. Peterson's confession and the information he provided
regarding the withheld evidence. Despite counsel's promises to conduct discovery and support
Mr. Johnson's claims, counsel did not support the 2009 petition with facts showing that it was
filed within a reasonable time. In addition to counsel's misrepresentations, Mr. Johnson alleged:
District Court error in not having a hearing on filed motions by the Petitioner that
were at the heart of the issues before the Court [pertaining] to the Summary
Dismissal that the Court was deciding on. Petitioner was trying to correct errors
by his counsel before the Court made a ruling.
CR 7. The Register of Actions for the 2009 action, of which the district court took judicial
notice, reflects that on December 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson filed the following: Motion to
Withdraw Counsel, Motion to Appoint Substitution Counsel, Motion to Continue, Motion to
Proceed without filing briefs, Motion for Order for Telephonic Hearing, Motion to Conduct
Discovery, Affidavit in Support of Motions. Equity demands that such personal attempts to
correct counsel's actions before the action is dismissed and which are ignored by the district
court be deemed sufficient to present the claims in a successive action.
The Court of Appeals concluded that claim preclusion bars Mr. Johnson from asserting
"different theories" in support of the claims already adjudicated - e.g. the timeliness of his 2009
petition. Johnson, No. 41414 at 5. The Court of Appeals further held that the sufficient reason
exemption in I.C. § 19-4908 is not inconsistent with res judicata and, instead, "exists for those
cases in which an issue was unascertainable or unavailable at the time of the original
post-conviction." Id. at p. 6. The Court concluded that claim preclusion bars re-litigation of the
claims in the second successive petition and the l.C. § 19-4908 exemption does not apply
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The Court of Appeals' conclusion cannot be reconciled with I.C. § 19-4908.s plain
language allowing a claim to be raised in a subsequent proceeding if it was inadequately raised in
prior post-conviction relief proceedings. If a claim was "unascertainable" or "unavailable," it
could not be "inadequately raised" in an initial post-conviction relief proceeding and instead,
would not be raised at all. Concluding that I.C. § 19-4908 applies only allow unknown claims
i.e. those that were not previously presented - renders the phrase inadequately raised a nullity.
Further, Mr. Johnson is not attempting to re-litigate previously raised claims by
supporting them with new theories. Rather, the instant petition asked the district court to
consider additional factual support for Mr. Johnson's claims, including timeliness. Mr. Johnson
would have presented this information in the 2009 proceedings if the district court had not
refused to acknowledge his requests to discharge his attorney and if the attorney had not
misrepresented the steps he would take to support Mr. Johnson's petition. Thus, the district
court's refusal to consider his prose motions and his attorney's affirmative misrepresentations
provide a sufficient reason justifying the failure to present this additional factual support in the
2009 proceedings.
The Court of Appeals rendered the phrase "inadequately raised" in I.C. § 19-4908 a
nullity by concluding that the statute only applied to unascertainable or unknowable claims.
Rather, I.C. § l 9-4908's plain language provides that a claim is not barred in a successive
proceeding if the petitioner can establish a sufficient reason explaining why it was inadequately
raised in the prior proceeding. This Court should therefore accept review and reverse the district
court.
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B.

This Court Should Accept Review, Reverse and Remand Because the District Court
Erred in Concluding That Mr. Johnson Had Not Produced Sufficient Evidence to
Establish an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Successive Petition Was Filed Within a
Reasonable Time and Counsel Was Not Permitted to Address Mr. Johnson's Other
Claims

Here, Mr. Johnson was not initially aware that a successive post-conviction application
was the appropriate remedy to bring the new information before the Court but immediately took
steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. Finally, about two
months later, an attorney informed Mr. Johnson that he could file a successive application for
post-conviction relief. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the appropriate request to obtain the
paperwork packet from the paralegal, wait for that paperwork to arrive from the prison mail
system, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the appropriate paperwork to make an
appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents notarized and mail them out. This
process took weeks of waiting. Mr. Johnson was given the incorrect address and sent the petition
to the prosecuting attorney for filing. See CR 28. Thus, the 2009 petition was delayed another
two weeks while Mr. Johnson mailed the petition to the correct address. Cf CR 21 with 24. Mr.
Johnson filed the instant successive petition approximately four months after Mr. Peterson
provided his confession and told Mr. Johnson about the withheld evidence.
Here, the district court incorrectly applied the standard applicable in death penalty cases
as set forth in Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642,649 (2008) to determine that
Mr. Johnson was required to initiate the successive action within 42 days within discovery of his
co-defendant's revelations or demonstrate "extraordinary" reasons for filing after forty-two days.
CR I 78-79, 296. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (a
reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after
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the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows
that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim
within that time period).
However, the effect of the expedited procedures mandated in death penalty case is
ameliorated by the automatic appointment of counsel to assist the petitioner with his postconviction remedies. See ICR 44.2 the district judge who sentenced the defendant [to death] shall
appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any
post-conviction remedy referred to in LC. Section 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to
seek") (emphasis added). Unlike the death penalty applicant, petitioners seeking relief under
Title 49 must prepare and file the initial and any successive petitions without the assistance of
legal counsel.
Contrary to the district court's conclusion Mr. Johnson should have known the time limit
for initiating a successive post-conviction relief action, Mr. Johnson could not have known he
was required to do so within 42 days. Instead, in providing for a year to file an initial postconviction relief, during which time the petitioner is presumed to know the basis for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the legislature acknowledged that a pro se prisoner is unlikely to be able to
immediately prepare and file a cause of action. Had Mr. Johnson known how to research the
issue, it is far more likely he would have sought guidance from LC. § 19-4902 and thought that a
year was a reasonable time to initiate the successive action. By holding Mr. Johnson to a
standard he could not have anticipated, the district court deprived him of any meaningful
opportunity to present his claims in deprivation of the procedural due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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Nor does Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413,913 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1996). cited by the
district court. signify that Mr. Johnson's ignorance of a successive post-conviction petition as the
correct procedural mechanism is irrelevant to the determination of the "reasonable" time frame.
CR 293. In Reyes, the defendant did not file within the statutory statute of limitations and her
ignorance as to that statutory period did not provide the basis for a discovery exception to the
statute of limitations. Reyes, 128 Idaho at 415,913 P.2d at 1185. Thus, Reyes simply stands for
the well established proposition that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Here, there is no
statutory time frame or other legal guidance illustrating the period to initiate a successive postconviction proceeding and Mr. Johnson could not have foreseen application of the death penalty
standard.
In response, the state claims that the additional facts Mr. Johnson presented explaining
his efforts in filing the instant petition cannot be considered because the petition's untimeliness is
res judicata. Respondent's Brief p. 12. However, as argued in Mr. Johnson's Opening Brief, res
judicata and the law preclude further consideration of the same issue. See also CR 297, citing
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474,480 (Ct. App. 2012) and Stuart v. State, 136
Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). A reasonable time is determined "on a case-by-case
basis." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The question now
before the Court is whether the additional information, which Mr. Johnson was prevented from
presenting due to the district court's failure to acknowledge his prose motions to excuse his
counsel, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a reasonable time. This issue was not
addressed in the prior proceedings and its consideration is not precluded by res Judi cata or the
law of the case.
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The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Johnson did not present an issue of fact as
to whether he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. Because counsel was
appointed to assist Mr. Johnson solely on the issue of timeliness and that is the only issue
addressed by the district court, this case must be remanded to allow for appointment of counsel
and to present further evidence in support of Mr. Johnson's substantive claims.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in his briefing to the Court of Appeals, Mr.
Johnson respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his postconviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this c2Siay of June, 2015
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

yn Fyffe
Attorneys for Robert Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this;2~ day of June, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served on the following individuals by the method indicated below:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 72 0-00 I 0
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